The Case for Religious Fictionalism: or How to Lead a Religious Life Without Faith or Belief

Rob Wheeler writes on the subject of religious fictionalism for the Spiritual Naturalist Society:

A major benefit of the fictionalist approach to religion is that cuts through a host of theological conundrums and excuses us from participation in interminable debates over anomalies and inconsistencies in doctrine. For instance by treating all religious texts as fictions, suspending disbelief and reading them like novels (‘as if’ true) we side-step the problem of scriptural accuracy and we can get on with the substantive business interpreting the stories and living the religious life. It also allows us to ignore all the insoluble metaphysical problems raised by a realist God. If God is read as a fictional character in our text then his reality becomes spiritual, mythic and poetic and all these problems dissolve, and we have no need to engage in theological rationalisation any more. It’s a great relief.

Religion is more than explanation
Many atheists seem to view religion as attempting to fulfil the same role as science, ie, explaining, predicting and manipulating natural phenomena, and nothing more. In pre-scientific cultures people explained complex events by appeal to occult supernatural agencies because they knew no better. We have the correct explanations through science now, it is argued, and so we no longer need religion. Religion is redundant along with falsified scientific theories like luminiferous aether and phlogiston and so can be jettisoned without regret.

True, religions traditionally contain explanatory content, and indeed atavistic believers like modern-day Creationists, still adhere to some of the outdated explanations offered by religion, but that does not exhaust what religions are all about. In addition to explanation religions also perform aesthetic, expressive, prescriptive, therapeutic, identity-molding and group-bonding functions. These are effected by the ‘cultic’ or practical side of religion, which I argue we can continue to appropriate without commitment to outdated explanations.